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The US and the Asian Development Bank: 
Origins, Structure and Lending Operations 
Nitish Dutt* 
[Abstract: The dominant discourse related to the establishment of the Asian Development 
Bank revolves around its structure, functions and lending operation. But the self-serving role 
played by the US during its formative years has been largely neglected. This article focuses on 
the early years of the Bank (1967-1972) and American efforts to make it a subservient tool of 
American foreign policy. A close examination of American role and influence within the Bank 
during its formative stage illustrates how multilateral institutions, funded by rich countries, 
can be used to force poor nations adopt methods for dealing with their problems, at odds with 
their own interest.l 
The idea of regional cooperation for mutually advantageous economic development 
has attracted growing attention since the end of WW II. The United States too had from 
time to time shown an interest in the idea but never pursued it actively. Starting in the 
mid sixties however, the US began to take an active interest and in fact was instrumen- 
tal in the formation of the Asian Development Bank and shaping its structure and func- 
tions. What accounts for this sudden shift in US willingness to get involved in the Bank 
"ground up?" This article explores why the US played a leading role in the formation of 
the Bank and how it shaped its structure and functions to subserve its own political and 
economic interests. 
While dominant discourse related to the ADB in general, its economic program, 
structure and lending operations,' little or no attention has been paid to examining the 
extent to which the Bank is a reflection of the priorities and concerns of its founding 
members, especially the US. 2 Thus, the existing narratives related to the formation of 
the Bank tends to overlook or ignore the self-serving rote played by the United States 
during the banks formative years. The paucity of secondary sources on the subject is 
reflective of this fact. A close examination of the role played by the US during its for- 
mative stages, helps to highlight the manner in which multilateral institutions, funded 
by rich countries, can be used to force poor countries to adopt methods for dealing with 
their problems at odds with their own interest. The parallels with the US role in shaping 
and controlling international agencies like the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank and their use as tools of American foreign policy, are quite striking. 
* Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, Bffkent University, Ankara, Turkey 































242 JCA 31:2 
For this purpose of illustrating America's role in the lormation and shaping of the 
Bank's identity and role, this article focuses on the years between 1965 and 1972. From 
the perspective of this article this period is important for a number of reasons. First, it 
was during this time that the United States was most active in guiding the activities of 
the Bank. First, American involvement in the formation and shaping of the Bank was 
most pronounced as the Johnson administration saw multilateralism as a way to influ- 
ence the policies of member countries, without raising the kind of questions related to 
the use of bilateral means. Second, the extent to which a supposedly autonomous, mul- 
tilateral institution can be reduced to the status of a policy instrument in the hands of the 
most powerful countries within the Bank, is most clearly illustrated by the American 
role during this period and lending activities of the fledgling Bank under pressure from 
the US and Japan. As the evidence presented in this paper suggests, the manner in 
which the US used its influence during the early years of the Bank was a source of 
concern and resentment among its more independent minded members. Despite this 
fact, American pressure, along with the cooperation of Japan and some developed coun- 
tries was instrumental in overcoming these objections. 
The US and the Formation of the ADB 
Suggestions for establishing a regional development bank in Asia, date back to as early 
as 1954. At that time the member countries of the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) and its secretariat began talking about the formation of an Asian 
development bank. Unfortunately the idea aroused little enthusiasm among the mem- 
ber countries, and the United States and Japan in particular, were actually opposed to it, 
as they saw drawbacks to such an institution. The United States "was reluctant to adopt 
a multilateral approach [to development aid] that would limit American influence," 
while Japan did not want to lend its resources to an institution "that seemed destined, 
like the World Bank to become primarily an instrument of American policy. ''3 
Discussion of the possibility of establishing the Bank was reactivated in August 
1963, again under the auspices of ECAFE. The initial impetus for forming the Bank and 
the proposal to do so emanated not from direct discussions among sovereign states, but 
within the framework of the ECAFE secretariat. It was U Nyun, ECAFE's executive 
secretary, rather than the Asian states (as Watanabe claimed 4) who then took the initia- 
tive in encouraging and channeling these discussions into concrete proposals. 
The discussion leading to the creation of the Bank moved quickly. In all it took two 
years from the first formal proposal to the signing of the agreement establishing the 
Bank. Generally speaking this period can be divided into two broad phases. From Au- 
gust 1963 to April 1965, the initiative and the enthusiasm came almost exclusively 































US and the ADB 243 
agreement and beyond, additional and perhaps crucial momentum was provided by the 
United States in the person of Eugene Black, former President of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (popularly known as the World Bank), who em- 
barked on a fund raising tour of  Europe. In his effort to secure the financial backing of 
the developed European countries for the proposed Bank, Black was eminently suc- 
cessful as witnessed by the large number of European countries which subsequently 
became members of the institution. 
His efforts were not confined to winning support for the Bank. He also played a 
central role in shaping and formulating the structure and functions of the Bank. From 
the United States point of view it was felt to be more important for the Bank to qualify 
as a solvent financial institution, than the Bank to have a clearly "Asian" character. 
Probably for this reason Eugene Black took a personal interest in the selection of the 
6 
Bank's first president, Takeshi Watanabe, a person who was considered to be "prima- 
rily responsible for Japan's success on the world capital market. ''7 With regard to giving 
the Bank an Asian character, the position of Japan as an Asian, yet developed country 
was bound to be crucial. However, Japan was initially reluctant to commit itself "lest it 
should find itself bearing a disproportionate financial burden" in an institution, which it 
felt seemed destined to become a tool of American policy, s 
Formal discussion of the possibility of setting up an Asian development bank be- 
gan in August 1963, under the auspices of ECAFE. This was the result of a resolution 
passed at the nineteenth session of ECAFE, early in I963, calling for accelerated mea- 
sures of regional economic cooperation The result was a proposal put forward by an 
expert group formed by U Nyun to establish an Asian bank. This proposal was endorsed 
by the ministerial conference held in Manila in December 1963, which directed that 
further studies should be undertaken. 
As a result another Ad hoc Working Group of Experts on the Bank was established 
by U Nyun under the chairmanship of Mr. M. Uquali, managing director of the Pakistan 
. , 70 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation. The group s report showed a sharp change 
of tone. The strategic view of the Bank as one of a broad range of instruments for 
changing the internal structure of the region gave way to a narrower, more institutional 
view in which the emphasis was on the functions, resources, and structures of the Bank 
itself. This change in outlook regarding the Bank can only be explained by the fact that 
the Expert Group consisted mainly of bankers so that their approach reflected their own 
professional inclinations. 
Under the terms of the original proposal the Bank had been conceived as an instru- 
ment for promoting regional economic cooperation among its Asian members, besides 
furthering economic development. Yet, from the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Ex- 
perts, it became clear that this important function was not only listed third in the order 































244 JCA 31:2 
was primarily concerned with the Bank's capital structure, subscriptions, voting and so 
on. In this connection, it is noteworthy that inspite of its concern for attracting addi- 
tional capital resources to the region, it gave virtually no consideration to the question 
of establishing a special fund for lending at low interest rates or soft terms. It was Mr. 
Black on behalf of the United States, who in his words found himself "in the unaccus- 
tomed position of urging my Asian friends not to rely too heavily on conventional in- 
struments of finance. The question that comes to mind m th~s connection ~s why was 
the United States so interested in establishing a soft fund when the would-be beneficia- 
ries themselves were not too keen, in the interest of seeing "their" bank qualify as a 
sound financial institution? The answer to the question is to be found in the nature of 
the Special Fund. As conceived by the United States and Japan, the loans made out of 
this fund would be tied to the purchase of goods and services from the donor countries. 
It was this aspect of the proposed soft loans which was possibly the main reason (though 
never openly expressed, except by Cambodia) u for the Asian regional countries being 
unenthusiastic about establishing a Special Fund. Their subsequent interest in such a 
fund would seem to be indicative of the success of  Black in calming the fears regarding 
the possibility that a tied Special Fund - as proposed by the United States and Japan 
could compromise the sovereignty and independence of these countries. 
Unlike the Ordinary Funds,13-the Special Fund was meant to finance the purchase 
of goods and services from the donor countries. Thus, whatever the amount of the United 
State's contribution to the Bank's Special Funds might be, the market for American 
goods and services would be enhanced to that extent. This point was repeatedly 
emphasised by Joseph W. Barry Under-Secretary of the Treasury, during the hearing on 
the Asian Development Bank Act and the Special Fund before the Committee on For- 
eign Relations. In his statement before the Committee on February 16, 1966, Barr 
emphasised that "any U.S. contributions as special funds to the Bank can be tied explic- 
itly to procurement in the United States. ''~4 
Guided by the Working Group's ideas and recommendations the ECAFE secre- 
t5 
tariat prepared a draft charter. The model that took shape was similar to the World 
Bank in character. What emerged was a straightforward financial institution, in which 
the developed countries would be dominant, and the chief purpose of which would be 
the financing of economic projects from its Ordinary Funds, selected on the basis of 
comparative rates of return on each loan. In other words financially profitable, quick 
return projects were to be given priority over projects which promised greater eco- 
nomic and social benefits in the long run to the recipient countries but slower and lower 
rates of return. 
This model was then presented to the twenty-first session of ECAFE, held in 
Wellington, New Zealand, in March 1965. According to the summary records, the rep- 































US and the ADB 245 
1 6  
Bank in their contributions to the discussions• The silence on the part of the United 
States was indicative of its lack of interest, since this meeting took place prior to the 
shift in United States policy towards greater support for regional institutions in South- 
east Asia. This position was to be dramatically reversed a month later. Also significant 
was the position taken by Japan, which, while expressing interest in principle, was of 
the opinion that "the cooperation and participation of the developed countries outside 
• . , , ] 7  
the region were essential. Roughly translated, this meant that Japan was waiting to 
see whether or not the Americans would join the Bank. 
It was clear that further persuasion of the developed countries and in particular the 
United States would be needed in order to get the Bank launched. The participants to 
the conference therefore adopted a resolution ~8 establishing a consultative committee, 
one of the principal functions of which was to undertake consultations with the govern- 
ments of the developed countries outside the region regarding their interest in and the 
extent of their likely participation in the Asian Development Bank. The countries repre- 
• . 1 9  . . . 
sented on the comnuttee were Ceylon, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Phil- 
ippines, the Republic of Vietnam, and Thailand• 
The scheme gained momentum in April 1965, when the United States for the first 
time manifested real interest in the institution. The reason for this sudden enthusiasm 
was apparently the war in Vietnam. The American commitment and casualties in the 
country were growing with alarming speed. Already, some 400 Americans had died 
there. Vietnam was fast developing into a trap from which it would be increasingly 
difficult to extricate the United States. 
Financial backing for the ADB and other regional organizations in similar situa- 
tions was probably seen as a way by which the United States, in cooperation with other 
developed countries, could help (at less cost to itself) the vulnerable nations of Asia to 
be more self-reliant economically and militarily, thereby strengthening their capacity to 
defend themselves against what it perceived to be the ever present communist threat. In 
addition, the United States by taking an active interest in the economic development of 
Asia could demonstrate to the world in general, and its Southeast Asian allies in par- 
ticular, that its concern for the economic welfare of these countries extended beyond its 
immediate political and security preoccupations. It was possibly because of these rea- 
sons that President Johnson in a speech delivered at John Hopkins University in April 
1965, declared that the United States was prepared to help regional self-help programmes 
2 0  
with a one billion dollar American investment. To implement this programme, he 
appointed Eugene Black as his special adviser on Southeast Asia. Black was instructed 
to contact Secretary General U Thant immediately to ask him what concrete steps the 
United States could take then and there to signal its interest in regional cooperation. 2~ 
American support for the proposed Bank now rapidly evolved into sponsorship. In 































246 JCA 31:2 
Asian region, one of which was the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Black embarked on 
a fund-raising tour of Europe. Washington's backing for the proposed Bank consider- 
ably improved the financial prospects of the institution and made it more acceptable to 
the developed Western countries as a whole. One indication of this was the decision of 
Switzerland, which had consistently refused to join the Bank, to become a full member, 
with a $5 million subscription. 
On the completion of its tour of potential member countries, the committee again 
reassembled in Bangkok in August for final discussions and to prepare a draft charter 
for the Bank. At a preparatory meeting of officials from 31 countries held in October, 
this draft charter was adopted with certain amendments. These amendments were pri- 
marily designed to clarify certain technical details• The only substantive matter to be 
dealt with in any detail by the Committee was related to the question of balance of 
control between the regional and non-regional members. It was decided that voting 
should be related to subscription, with only a small redress in favour of the smaller 
members through the allocation of 20% of the votes, which were to be divided equally 
among all the members of the Bank regardless of the level of their subscription. To 
make this arrangement more acceptable to regional members like Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and the less developed Asian countries, it was decided that these countries 
should always have a majority of the voting power. This was meant to assure the "Asian" 
character of the institution. 
The delegation from the Soviet Union was the only one to point out the weakness 
of this assurance, arguing that the significant feature of the proposed voting power was 
• , ,  . . . , , 2 3  . 
that the developing countries would always be in a minority. From then on, It was 
clear that the Soviet Union was not going to become a member. It is interesting and 
somewhat intriguing to note that Mr. Black, who was present at the meeting, subse- 
quently stated in reply to a question from Senator Aiken (during the course of the hear- 
ing on the ADB Act) as to why the Soviet Union declined to join the Bank: "I don't 
remember what the reasons were or if I did hear I didn't understand them"! 24 Black's 
answer represented an attempt to evade a question, a direct answer to which could have 
led to a number of more awkward queries, as regards the United States' role in assuring 
the dominance of the developed countries within the Bank. 
The Bangkok meeting was followed by one in Manila where the Consultative Com- 
mittee prepared a final report. This was presented to a conference of Asian ministers 
which took place in Manila immediately afterwards. The conference accepted the draft 
25 
charter, but got entangled in the question of location of the Bank's headquarters. After 
considerable discussion and lobbying, Manila was selected, much to the disappoint- 
ment of the other members, especially Iran and Japan. As a matter of fact, Iran, of- 
































US and the ADB 247 
Following the adoption of the draft text by the Asian ministers, the agreement was 
signed in Manila at a Conference of Plenipotentiaries of thirty one countries that fol- 
lowed immediately after the Ministerial Conference. The agreement was then left open 
for further signatures until 31 January 1966, in Bangkok• It entered into force on 22 
August 1966, when in accordance with the charter it had been ratified or accepted by 
fifteen signatories, including at least ten countries in the ECAFE region, whose initial 
subscription in the aggregate comprised not less than sixty-five per cent of the authorised 
• 2 6  . . . .  
capital stock of the Bank. The inaugural meeting was held in Tokyo m November, and 
was attended by thirty-one countries. 
The speed with which the discussions moved after the appearance of Black on the 
scene suggests that the most conspicuous accelerating force was the sudden interest of 
the United States. Part of the explanation is to be found in the desire of the United States 
to "become active at... [the] very beginning," so as to increase its "own constructive 
influence in the organisation and management of the Bank. ''28 However, this does not 
constitute a sufficient explanation of the speed with which the preparatory discussions 
were completed. A more satisfactory explanation is to be found in the success of the 
developed states in foisting a prefabricated institutional formula, which was not in any 
sense derived from the needs of the Asian nations, upon the prospective members. 
Furthermore, the importance of the American role in speeding up the process of 
establishing the Bank seems to be reinforced by the fact that it was the backing of the 
United States which ensured the approval of other Western nations for the Bank. Equally 
significant was the presence of Eugene Black coupled with the election of Mr. Watanabe, 
and the general awareness, among. 29 financial specialists that rates of return on investment 
in Asia are exceptionally high, ensured the confidence of international financial insti- 
tutions. This confidence was expressed at the inaugural meeting in Tokyo, in November 
1966, by the presence of the representatives of some sixty commercial banks and other 
financial corporations, including more than twenty each from the United States and 
Japan, and eight from Britain. 3° 
The strong dependence of the developing countries on the United States, both for 
its financial contributions and for securing donations of capital from other developed 
Western countries, gave it a big voice in the shaping of the Bank along lines favourable 
to the pursuit of its own political and economic interests, This dependence meant that 
the developing regional members, even though they had some reservations, especially 
with regard to the distribution of voting power within the Bank, were compelled to go 
along with the position taken by the developed countries. It was a case of beggars can 
never be choosers. 
The professed objective of the Bank, as laid out in the Articles of Agreement, is to 
"foster economic growth and co-operation" in the Asian region and to accelerate the 































248 JCA 31:2 
collectively and individually. ''3~ Hence, economic development is explicitly equated 
with economic growth, suggesting a purely quantitative approach devoid of any quali- 
tative aspects like "social progress." This latter concept was dropped, and was replaced 
by the looser term "cooperation," which had emerged in the sixties as a catchword for 
the comfort of small and vulnerable developing countries, anxious to construct larger 
political and economic units. The assumption was that such units in some sense would 
be more viable. For developed countries "viable" meant "not needing aid." For devel- 
oping countries, it meant among other things being in a stronger bargaining position to 
get more aid. 
In keeping with its purpose, the Bank is required to give priority to projects and 
programmes which would effectively promote "harmonious economic growth of the 
region as a whole." At the same time, it is required to give special consideration to the 
needs of the smaller nations. The Bank's functions also include the promotion of public 
and private investment, the provision of assistance in the coordination of national poli- 
cies, particularly in foreign trade, and the provision of technical assistance in the prepa- 
ration of projects. 
The financial resources of the Bank consist of the authorised capital stock, funds 
raised by borrowings, funds received in repayment and income derived from loans and 
guarantees, and any other funds received which do not constitute "Special Funds." From 
its ordinary resources, the Bank may set aside 10% of its paid-in capital for the purpose 
of establishing Special Funds. It may also accept resources for administration as Spe- 
cial Funds, provided that these funds are designed to serve the purpose and come within 
the functions of the Bank. Special Funds derived from the Bank's own resources are to 
be used for lending on more generous terms than those established by the Bank for its 
ordinary operations. Special Funds received from other sources may be used in any 
manner that is consistent with the Bank's functions, subject to an implicit reservation 
concerning such conditions as may be attached to their use by the country or institution 
which provides them. Theoretically speaking, the Bank would seem to have had a lot of 
leeway in the administration of the Special Fund, but in actual practice the position was 
quite different. 
Within the Bank, those who had given most thought to the question of Special 
Funds were the executive directors representing the developed countries. If this at first 
seems odd, it becomes more readily explainable in the context of the political and eco- 
nomic objectives of the larger donors within the Bank, especially the United States and 
Japan. While the charter empowers the Bank, under the supervision of its Board of 
Directors, to administer the funds and make the detailed programme judgments in- 
volved, it can do so only with the expressed consent of the Governors of the countries 
contributing to the Special Funds. For example, the Special Report of the National 































us  and the ADB 249 
the main channel through which the United States would exercise its influence in shaping 
Bank decisions regarding special funds would be the U.S. representation on the Bank's Board 
of Governors and the Board of Directors, in which the principle of weighted voting applies. J3 
This arrangement, then, permits the United States "to make stipulations regarding the 
use of... funds when given... ''34 
The Bank is open to membership by members and associate members of  the United 
Nations ECAFE and by other regional and non-regional Countries which are members 
35 
of "the United Nations or any of its specialised agencies. Thus, the Chinese Peoples'  
Republic (at the time of  the Bank's formation), Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, 
and Democratic Republic of  Vietnam were not eligible for membership. It was origi- 
nally hoped36 that the Soviet Union would join," and this" hope was shared by the United 
States. However, the Soviet Union along with the East European countries refused to 
join,  on the grounds that it objected to the proposed distribution of  voting power be- 
tween the developed countries and the developing countries. For  the same reason, France 
37 
also refused to join in the beginning. 
The absence of  any Communist  country in the ADB led Henry S. Bloch, one of 
those most closely associated with its creation, to regard the institution as having a 
frankly "Western" image. 38 Apparently for this reason, Burma and Outer Mongolia re- 
fused invitations to join. For similar reasons Indonesia did not apply for membership 
until the fall of  Sukarno in 1966 who during the later years of  his rule, considered the 
United Nations and other or~anisations of  which the United States was a member, as 
tools of  neo-colonlahsm. Cambodia  accepted membership,  but with some qualms, 
which were clearly expressed at the inaugural meeting of  the Bank. Mr. Son Sann, 
Governor for Cambodia,  observed: 
• . .  we cannot ignore the fact that many Asian countries remain outside this organisation. In 
our opinion, their absence should not be ascribed to any deliberate desire to neglect, or to 
show indifference towards, the best interests of this part of the world. But it is perhaps due 
rather to misgivings lest the Bank should neglect the objectives set out in its statutes.., and 
should engage in other activities of a more or less political nature. 
From this point of view, Cambodia's decision to become a member of the Asian Development 
Bank is attended with a certain amount of risk. With this consideration in mind, Cambodia... 
asks,., that it should be treated fairly without recourse to occult pressures or discriminatory 
practices. 4° 
Cambodia subsequently announced its withdrawal from membership, but later retracted 
its withdrawal. 4~ 
Admission of  new members requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the total 
number of  governors, representing not less than 75% of  the total voting power. This 
means that neither the United States nor Japan by itself has a veto, but combined the 
two countries, with 34.24% of  the voting strength (see Table 1. I ), can prevent any new 
member from being admitted, if they choose to do so. In any case, even if they did not 
act in concert, it is unlikely that any new member  could be admitted against opposition 































250 JCA 31:2 
Table 1: Loans --Approvals and Commitments as of 31 December 1.972 
Ordinary Special Ordinary Capital + 
Country Capital Funds Special Funds 
Afganistan - 5.15 5.15 
Republic of  China 99.99 - 99.99 
Fiji 4.70 - 4.70 
Hongkong 21.50 - 21.50 
Indonesia - 69.64 69.64 
Khmer Republic - 1.67 1.67 
Republic of  Korea i 96.80 3.70 200.50 
Laos - 4.34 4.34 
Malaysia  76.60 3.30 82.90 
Nepal 2.00 35.71 35.71 
Pakistan 67.15 18.20 85.35 
Papua New Guinea - 14.60 14.60 
Philippines ! 01.75 3.50 105.25 
Singapore 91.38 3.00 94.38 
Sri Lanka 13.14 22.41 35.54 
Thailand 75.00 - 75.00 
Republic of  Vietnam - 11.30 11.30 
Western Samoa - 5.33 5.33 
Total 753.01 ~ 201.55 954.55 ~ 
' Excludes $0.4 million approved in 1968 and $ 0.5 approved in 1970 incorporated in new loans in 1970 
and 197 I, respectively. 
Source: Asian Development Bank Report, 1972, p. 42. 
Annex A of  the Agreement divides the subscribers into two categories: regional 
and non-regional members.  Subscriptions are allotted to regional members in accor- 
dance with a scale derived from gross domestic product, adjusted for population, total 
exports, and total tax revenues. The subscriptions of  non-regional members depend on 
42 
what they are willing to offer above the prescribed minimum of  $5 million. The only 
other stipulation laid down in the Agreement besides this was that the capital stock held 































US and the ADB 251 
The Articles of Agreement provide for an authorised capital of the Bank of $1000 
million of which $500 million was to be paid-in and $500 million was callable if re- 
quired. At the inaugural meeting, the Board of Governors authorised an increase in the 
capital stock to $1,100 million. At the time of the meeting, the capital subscription 
• 4 4  
amounted to $970 mdlion. The paid-in portion of the subscriptions was to be paid in 
five equal installments. 4s One half of the paid-in capital was payable in gold or convert- 
ible currency, the other half in the currency of the member.4~This provision has the 
effect of doubling the subscriptions (paid-in portion) of those members who have con- 
vertible currencies, i.e., the developed countries, in relation to the subscription of the 
developing countries. This in turn helps to strengthen the position of member countries 
like the United States, with a convertible currency, within the Bank. 
The day-to-day supervision of the general operations of the Bank rests with the 
Board of Directors• The Board consists of ten Directors, seven to represent the Asian 
regional countries elected by the governors representing the regional members and three 
representing the non-regional countries to be elected by the governors representing the 
"47  . . . .  
non-regional members. The size of the subscrlptlons of the Umted States (a non-re- 
gional member) and of Japan (a regional member) enables them to elect their own 
directors to the Board even though the voting procedure does provide some safeguards 
to ensure a relatively even distribution of voting power among the members of the 
ADB. To be elected, a director representing the regional countries requires only 10% of 
the votes of such countries. In the case of the non-regional countries, however, a direc- 
tor, in order to be elected had to receive at least 25% of the total votes of non-regional 
members. Such a procedure was meant to ensure that no director could be elected out- 
right by a single non-regional member. While this particular safeguard seems quite 
effective for the bulk of the non-regionals, it was not very effective with regard to the 
United States, since that country already had a high percentage of votes (17.1%) allot- 
ted to it, and required only a further 7.9% to assure itsetf of a directorship. 
Likewise, among the regional members, Japan, controlling 17.1% of the votes, is 
able to guarantee the election of a Japanese director. 4s Another reason for this disparity 
in the voting power of the members is the division of the member countries into re- 
gional and non-regional members, which results in the directors with the largest num- 
ber of votes, representing developed countries exclusively! (see Tabte 2). 49 Hence, the 
influence of the two most powerful directors in 1967 exceeded by a considerable mar- 
gin the voting power of the weakest, that the two most powerful directors with 34% of 
the votes, represented developed countries exclusively, and that the three weakest di- 
rectors represented developing countries exclusively. These figures, are therefore in- 
dicative of the relative degrees of influence of the member countries, especially the 































252 JCA 31:2 
Table 2: Share and Voting Power of Members of the Asian Development Bank 
1967-1972 
Member Country % of Total Votes 
1967 1972 
Developed Countries: 
U.S.A. ! 7.12 8.42 
Japan 17.12 20.24 
TOTAL: U.S.A. & Japan 34.24 28.66 
Other non-regi0nal: 
Austria 1.04 1.03 
Belgium 1.04 0.74 
Canada 2.69 3.00 
Denmark 1.04 1.03 
Finland 1.04 0.74 
France - -  1.53 
FRG 3.34 1.88 
Italy 2.27 1.34 
Netherlands 1.53 0.97 
Norway 1.04 0.74 
Sweden 1.04 0.74 
Switzerland 1.04 0.74 
U.K. 3.10 3.30 
Total: Other Non-Regional 20.30 17.98 
Other Regional: 
Australia 7.64 8.91 
New Zealand 2.48 2.76 
Total: Other Regional 10.12 11.67 
TOTAL: DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 64.66 58.31 
Developing Countries 
South Asia: 
India 8.30 9.70 
Pakistan 3.26 3.69 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 1.33 1.38 
Nepal 0.80 0.60 
Afganistan 1.02 1.01 
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Member  Coun t ry  % of Total Votes 
1967 1972 
Southeast Asia : 
Indonesia 2.69 3.00 
Cambodia 0.91 0.68 
Laos 0.66 0.58 
Malaysia 2.27 2.51 
Singapore 1.04 1.03 
Thailand 2.27 2.51 
Rep. of  Vietnam 1.61 1.72 
Phillipines 3.51 3.99 
Total: Southeast Asia 14.96 16.02 
Far East : 
Rep. of  China 1.94 2.12 
Rep. of  Korea 3.10 3.50 
Total: Fa r  East  5.04 5.62 
Other: 
Western Samoa 0.63 0.54 
TOTAL: D E V E L O P I N G  C O U N T R I E S  35.34 38.65 
Source: Compiled from Asian Development Bank, Annual Report for 1968 and 1972, Appendix I-VII and 
1-V respectively. 
Furthermore, the overall impression one gets by examining the speeches of  the 
governors at the annual meetings of  the Bank is that the directors most active in policy 
5O 
formulation are those with the largest voting power. The smaller developing coun- 
tries, like Cambodia and Ceylon, had anticipated such a development, and they there- 
fore sought concessions, such as an increase in the number of  directors to allow them 
stronger participation in the administration of  the Bank. Mr. N. Wimalasena, Governor 
for Ceylon, in his inaugural speech emphasised this point and observed: 
While... in drafting the Charter of the Bank an effort was made to give the smaller countries 
more recognition, it does not seem to have adequately provided a means whereby the smaller 
countries" could participate in the active directions~ of the Bank's affairs and we hope that steps 
will be taken to remedy this situation early. 
Accordingly, the Agreement provided that after two years the size and composition of  
the Board of  Directors would be reviewed by the Board of  Governors. No change was, 
however, made in the composition o f  the Board when it came up for review. In any 
case, a change in the number of  Directors would not affect the number of  votes cast by 
the United States or other countries, since voting strength is related to the size of  the 
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Thus, each member has one vote for each share he holds• Twenty percent of the 
votes are allocated as basic votes at a uniform rate of 778 votes per country; the balance 
is distributed in proportion to each country's subscription. Originally Eugene Black 
representing the United States, and Takeshi Watanabe on behalf of Japan, fought for 
95% of voting strength to be based on contributions. They reluctantly accepted 80% of 
• 52 
the votes to be based on donations of capital. 
Since the balance-of-power within the Bank is overwhelmingly in favour of the 
developed countries (a ratio of almost 2 to 1), lack of absolute control was not a high 
price for the United States to pay. It was unlikely that any important decision could be 
taken against American interests• Important questions required a two-thirds majority so 
that Japan and any other member could at least theoretically block any major decision. 
To ensure or block the passage of any proposal by the two-thirds or three-fourths major- 
ity required by the charter, they had only to pressure such heavily dependent nations as 
Taiwan, South Korea, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, West Samoa and the Philippines. 
As Blackte ti a ,,,L s fie,.,: rue malonty of the votes are from the capital exporting countries, 
• " , ,~53 
which is very important. In other words, the borrowers can t run the Bank. 
In addition, it must be borne in mind that one of the Asian members, Japan, is a 
developed country. As has been pointed out by some in Japan's foreign policy its Status 
as a developed country is emphasised at least as strongly as its adherence to Asia. 54 
When the two orientations are in conflict, it is Japan the developed country which tends 
to dominate. Within the context of the Bank the important point is not that Japan is a 
regional member, but that it is one of the two principle subscribers with an economic 
perspective similar to that of the United States. 
Thus, the real division within the Bank was between the developed and developing 
countries, and it was a division in which the developed countries, with nearly two- 
thirds of the voting power, were overwhelmingly the dominant partners. One should 
perhaps add in this connection that this division was on occasions misleading. The 
position of the United States and Japan with clear cut objectives was sometimes distinct 
from that of the other developed countries, for which the Bank was only of marginal 
interest, and which can therefore take a more flexible approach. Some of these coun- 
tries became members as a result of American pressure, which was motivated by the 
desire of the United States to acquire partners in its Asian commitments. Once in, they 
were bound to give thought to their role. Canada, for instance consistently took a stand 
which was markedly different from that of the United States. At the first annual meeting 
of the Board of Governors, for example, the Canadian alternate governor stated his 
government's view regarding tying contributions to the Special Funds of the Bank. It 
was a viewpoint that was rather different from that of the United States and Japan: 
Our assistance to a Special Fund is intended to be as free as possible from restrictions• Al- 
though our contributions wil l  be tied to purchases of Canadian good and services, this provi- 
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He went on to point out that the use of contributions to the Special Funds should be 
governed not by the general objectives and priorities of the individual members con- 
tributing such special funds but by those of the Bank• As a way out of the problem of 
tied funds, the Canadian Governor suggested that while the contributions could remain 
tied, they should be "opened to the fullest extent possible to international competitive 
bidding." This would enable, he argued, the developing recipient nations to procure the 
• . . 5 6  . 
reqmred goods and services at the most favourable price. However, nothmg was done 
in order to implement this suggestion. 
A further point of note, related to American influence within the Bank, is that the 
origins of its involvement - -  problems of political instability in Southeast Asia, in- 
creasing problems in Vietnam, it's strong investment and trade interests in the region 
suggested that the Bank would be most active in Southeast Asia. As will be seen a little 
later, this is precisely the area in which the Bank concentrated its lending activities 
during the early years of its operations. Given the highly skewed distribution of voting 
power within the ADB, an orientation of this kind could not spring from the Bank's 
Asian character. With less than 15% of the voting power the Southeast Asian countries 
constituted a very small minority. Thus, the concentration on this region tends to further 
corroborate the contention that the Asian Bank at its founding was not an Asian institu- 
tion, but rather a policy instrument for the pursuit of the interests of its largest donors, 
made possible by the nature of the voting system• It was for this reason that David 
Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury in his letter to Gale McGee, Chairman of the Sub- 
committee on Foreign Operations, U.S. Senate wrote: 
Congress has made funds available to these institutions because of their..• important contribu- 
tion.., to furthering United States objectives in Southeast Asia. 5~ 
The ADB's Lending Operations 
Up to this point I have tried to document the extent of American influence (as also 
Japan's, America's close friend and ally) in shaping the organisation and structure of 
the Bank, especially the way in which voting power was distributed among its mem- 
bers. Now I want to demonstrate how United States influence within the Bank has 
manifested itself in one crucial aspect of the Bank's day to day activities, namely its 
lending operations, the primary rationale for the ADB's activities. 
President Watanabe once argued that his Bank should be a bank with "a heart," not 
, ,  . . 5 8  . . 
simply a money lending machme." Paradoxically, this Is precisely what the Bank 
seemed to have become. A partial explanation for this would seem to lie in, as Watanabe 
has often stated, the need to follow sound banking principles. In practice this meant 
establishing a high credit standing and proving the worthiness of the institution. How- 
ever, since the Bank at the same time professes to pay special attention to the needs of 
the smaller, poorer regional countries, this explanation does not seem fully satisfactory. 
An alternative and more plausible one, and one that goes against the dominant narra- 
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countries like the United States and Japan, wanted to emphasise its role as a "bank" 
m o r e  than that of a regional financial institution, whose primary tasks are to promote 
the economic and social well being of its Asian members• 
This orientation is only to be expected given the considerations underlying ADB 
loans. A review of the statutes reveals three primary considerations which can be 
summarised as follows: 1) Priority is to be given to countries where certain conditions 
making for viable development exist and with populations possessed of the will to 
work; 2) Aid will be restricted to countries possessed of sufficiently ample means to 
ensure repayment; 3) Interest rates will be adjusted, so far as this proves feasible, with 
due attention being paid to the nature of the loan granted, but the Bank will be required 
• . 5 9  . . ~ . 
to ensure that ~t recewes a reasonable return. These principles, from the ADB s point 
of view, were basic to sound banking and vigorously supported by the US. In the words 
of United States Treasury Secretary Fowler the Bank was expected to "concentrate its 
energies and skills first and foremost on becoming a banking ins t i tu t ion . . .  [with] 
prudent management of funds, high standards of loan appraisals . . .  [and] policies that 
. . 6 0  . . . .  
permit accumulation .... A comparison of the gmdehnes laid down by the Bank and 
those laid down by Secretary Fowler shows that the American vision prevailed. 
6 1  
Between 1968 and 1972 (Table 3), 77% (117 loans totahng $753,005,000 mil- 
lion) of all ADB loans were hard loans made out of its ordinary resources. The terms of 
these loans ranged from ten to twenty-five years at a rate of 6.9% (which was increased 
in mid 1970 to 7.5%). On these terms the Bank's loans could hardly be called aid. They 
are scarcely distinguishable from commercial bank loans. Not surprisingly, the ADB's 
first loan went to the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand, an institution that 
could easily have gotten the money elsewhere. 
Table 3: ADB Loan Approvals 1968 -1972 (million US $) 
Loans From Ordinary Loans From Special 
Capital Resources Resources Total Loans 
Year Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. 
1968 41,600,000 7 __ __ 41,600,000 7 
1969 76,095,000 14 22,005,000 6 98,100,000 20 
1970 211,940,000 22 33,693,000 10 245,633,000 32 
1 9 7 1  202,520,000 16 51,510,000 12 254,030,000 28 
1972 221,750,000 16 94,340,000 16 316,090,000 32 
TOTAL 753,005,000 73 ~ 201,548,000 44 954,553,000 ~ 117 
Source: ADB Annual Reports 1968-1972. 'Excludes $0.5 million approved in 1968 and $0.5 million 
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Given the interest rates which have applied to its ordinary funds, ADB loans only 
added to the debt burden of the poor nations of the area, already staggering under ser- 
6 2  
vice payments in view of an existing foreign debt of about $1.2 billion per year. Only 
23% (44 loans totaling $20,548,000) of ADB loans advanced between 1968 and 1972 
were "soft" (low interest) ones. Although between 1971 and 1972 the amount of the 
soft loans approved by the Bank increased by 54.6% ($42,830,000 million), it was still 
far less than the amount of ordinary loans approved by the Bank. These loans were 
made from the Bank's "Special Funds," donated by individual countries with strings 
attached to them. These funds are not, however, part of the Ordinary Funds of the Bank. 
The comparatively larger amount of ordinary loans made by the Bank, based on the 
capabilityof its Asian regional members to pay higher rates of interest, is, therefore, 
reflective of the viewpoint of the developed-countries and the relatively more devel- 
oped Asian regional countries, that the Bank must follow sound banking principles. 
The support of countries like the Republic of Korea, Republic of China, Thailand and 
so on for the Bank's lending policy was only to be expected since they naturally felt that 
they would be the prime beneficiaries of such a policy. 
An operative philosophy of this kind, hence had its spin-offs for the United States 
in the form of furthering its political, security and economic interests in Southeast Asia. 
Of all the regional developing countries of Southeast Asia, only relatively more devel- 
oped countries like Thailand, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Republic of China and so 
on had the capacity to draw up sound loan proposals and absorb the high interest rates 
on Ordinary loans. Since the bulk of the ADB loans have been made from its ordinary 
resources, it is these countries which tended to benefit most from the ADB's lending 
activities. It should at the same time be borne in mind, that these are the very countries 
in which the United States had deep and abiding interests. Hence, it can be argued that 
by concentrating its ordinary loan operations in these countries, the Bank not only helped 
to reduce American aid commitments to these countries, but also in the long run, by 
promoting economic growth and the concomitant stability that would result from it, 
served (from the point of view of United States thinking at least) to make these coun- 
tries less vulnerable to communist influence, thus fulfilling a major goal of United 
States Cold War foreign policy. Simultaneously, the enhanced economic prosperity of 
these countries makes them more attractive for the American investor in terms of trade 
and investment. 
The "soft loans" of the Bank also tend to serve a similar purpose. These loans have 
generally gone to a handful of relatively less developed countries of Asia like Indone- 
sia. As the loans from the soft funds are tied loans, and since the United States happens 
to be one of two major contributors, those countries which received loans from the 
United States share of the contribution to the Special Funds will of necessity be tied to 
. .  6 3  . . 
it economically and polmcally. Indonesia which monopolised the soft loans of the 
Bank was a good case in point. Since the overthrow of President Sukarno in October 
1965, by means of a military coup, it was dependent on direct American aid and aid 
assistance channeled through American dominated financial institutions making it po- 
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An analysis of the distribution of ADB loans by country helps to illustrate the 
extent to which the ADB served the interests of the United States. Table 3 shows the 
distribution of ADB Ordinary and Special Funds loans by country up to the end of 
1972 Four nations, Taiwan ($196.8 million), South Korea i$100.4 million), Phil ipines 
($101.5 million), and Thailand ($74.2 million) together received 62.8% ($473.4 mil- 
lion) of all ADB loans made out of its ordinary resources. Out of the $201.5 million soft 
loans made by the Bank, Indonesia alone garnered $69.6 rnitlion (34.5%), Philippines 
($3.5 million), Taiwan ($3.7 million) and South Vietnam ($11.3 million). Together these 
four nations accounted for 43.7% of the Bank's soft loans. Ten other countries - Af- 
ghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka and Western Samoa - have together received only $113.4 million or 57.3% of 
all soft loans. 
It should be clear from the way the Ordinary and Soft loans were distributed that 
the bulk of ADB loans between 1968 and 1972 went to those countries which were 
closely aligned to the United States, both politically and economically. What is note- 
worthy about all these countries is their dependence on the United States, which made 
them pliable and cooperative allies, a fact that assumes great importance with respect to 
the pattern of distribution of ADB loans. Viewed from this perspective it does not seem 
to be sheer coincidence, that Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and 
Republic of China, countries which together accounted for 72.2% ($1183 million) of all 
. . . .  6 4  . . 6 5  
American aid to South and Southeast Asia m 1971 (excluding India ) also received 
90.6% ($230.1 million) of ADB loans from its Ordinary and Special Funds during the 
same year. A significant point that emerges out of the foregoing discussion is that the 
ADB has been most active in Southeast Asia, rather than in "Asia," an understandable 
fact considering that it happens to be the primary area of American interest in Asia. As 
Black emphasised during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
in 1967: " . . .  as far as the United States is concerned our interest is that this money 
[contribution to the Special Funds] be used i n . . .  Southeast Asia," an area of"primary 
• ,~  . 6 6  . . 
interest to the Umted States. For this reason, the Spemal Report of September 1967 
of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies on 
Special Funds of the ADB states that the United State~, at the time it initially agreed to 
provide the funds "can stipulate the purpose for which ~be ~'unds could be used and the 
basis on which they would be made available. ''~7 A special geographic emphasis seems 
to have been an implicit stipulation which was attached "to the United States contribu- 
tion to the Special Funds of the ADB. 
The ADB's president Mr. Takeshi Watanabe once claimed that the Bank is not 
guided by political considerations, or o~pen to pressure from any country, when it exam- 
ines the merits of a project proposal. In fact, this has not always been the case. For 
example, the ADB did not make any loans to Cambodia while Prince Norodom Sihanouk 
was in power, primarily because during the later years of his rule he had become an 
outspoken critic of United States policy in Southeast Asia. 69 Its single loan to Cambo- 
dia was approved two weeks after the coup which overthrew him, and established a 
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70 
prise system. The new, acceptable attitude of Cambodia was apparent in the statement 
made by Mr. Mau Say, the Alternate Governor for Cambodia at the third annual meet- 
ing of  the Board of  Governors, held in Seoul, in April 1970: 
• . . o u r  nation is more than ever determined to follow the path leading to nation building by 
promoting private initiative and by practicing an open door policy .... Furthermore, new and 
liberal laws grant numerous advantages and facilities to foreign investors. They offer many 
opportunities for the employment of available capital which will not fail to find security and 
profitability on Cambodian territory. 7~ 
C o n c l u s i o n  
The conclusions to be drawn from the preceding discussion can be summed up very 
briefly. The Asian Development Bank is certainly a bank and on that basis it is not to be 
criticised for seeking a high standard in being what it is. A large part of  the reason for 
this orientation is to be found in the priorities of  its major donors, the first of  which was 
the establishment of a sound banking institution. Consequently, its role as a Bank has 
been emphasised more than its role as a "catalyst" to promote regional economic co- 
operation among its members.  
Again, because of  the influence of its major financial backers, - -  the United States 
and Japan, the geographical focus of  the Bank's  lending activities has been predomi- 
nantly Southeast Asia,  with particular attention having been given to five major Asian 
allies of  the United States: Indonesia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Republic of  Tai- 
wan and Thailand. 
Although the Bank was supposed to be an independent "Asian" institution, in it 
early years (and even to a large extent today) it was neither independent nor "Asian." 
First, except for Japan, the most influential members of  the Bank are not Asians. Sec- 
ond, power within the Bank rests primarily with the United States and Japan along with 
the other developed member nations. For  all practical purposes, the Bank became an 
agency for the transmission of  multilateral aid and western technology to countries 
selected largely by its developed members.  Finally, loans made by the Bank went pre- 
dominantly to those countries in which the United States had significant economic and 
political interests. In short, one of  the major reasons for American interest in creating 
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